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Abstract
Lottery-linked deposit accounts are ﬁnancial assets that provide an interest rate
determined by a lottery. The aim of this study is to determine the optimal design
of these ﬁnancial assets (under cumulative prospect theory (CPT) framework). We
underline that the weighting functions usually speciﬁed in the literature should be
re-modeled if we want to apply CPT to ﬁnance. We propose to replace them by
another functional form that preserves the main characteristics of the inverse S-shape
speciﬁcation, but whose slope at zero is ﬁnite. The optimal structure of payments
obtained is consistent with the conclusions of behavioral portfolio theory (2000).
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11 Introduction
Expected utility theory has been considered for several decades to be a benchmark for
describing decision making under risk. According to this normative model of rational
choices, attitude towards risk is entirely characterized by the shape of the utility function.
In economics and ﬁnance, it is generally assumed that investors are risk-averse. Their
behavior is then modeled by a concave utility function. However, Pﬁﬀelmann and Roger
(2005) and Pﬁﬀelmann (2007b) point out that the popularity of some ﬁnancial assets, such
as lottery-linked-deposit-accounts (LLDA), challenges this assumption. LLDA are ﬁnan-
cial assets that provide an interest rate determined by a lottery (Guillen and Tschoegl,
2002). Their existence cannot be explained in the framework of expected utility models
since a risk-averse investor would accordingly always prefer to get the expected value of a
lottery rather than participate in the gamble. Pﬁﬀelmann and Roger (2005) and Pﬁﬀel-
mann (2007b) show that rank dependent expected utility (Quiggin, 1982) and cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) provide a good explanation for
the emergence of these deposit accounts by integrating simultaneous risk-averse and risk-
seeking behaviors. By comparing two LLDA, they establish that a modiﬁcation, ”ceteris
parebus”, of the structure of payments of the lottery associated to these kinds of assets,
in the sense of an increase in the positive asymmetry, could improve the appeal of the ac-
count. Therefore, a link exists between the design of these ﬁnancial assets, their popularity
and the cost of the issuer.
The purpose of the present paper is to use this relation to determine the optimal
design of LLDA. We investigate on the ”best” structure of payments of these types of
ﬁnancial assets. In order to optimize the lottery design, we maximize the satisfaction of
investors given an issuer’s cost equal to the risk-free interest rate. The optimization pro-
gram leads to an optimal and relevant structure of payments. The results show that the
lottery should be strongly asymmetrical. The explanation lies in the tendency individuals
have to overweight the extremely low probability of the desired outcome. Links with the
ﬁrst version (the single account version) of the behavioral portfolio theory (BPT- SA)
developed by Shefrin and Statman (2000) can thus be established. In a second step, weinvestigate on the optimal design of LLDA when both payments and probabilities should
be determined; we look for the optimal structure of payments and the associated optimal
probabilities. Our results allow us to discuss the shape of the Tversky and Kahneman’s
weighting function. We underline that there are situations for which the subjective value
of the jackpot of the lottery weighted by its decision weight can be inﬁnitely high. This
solution suggests that an inﬁnite jackpot associated with an extremely small probability
should be suﬃcient to attract lots of investors. This is quite unrealistic. Therefore, if we
want to apply CPT to portfolio selection or to any ﬁelds of ﬁnance, this theory has to be
re-modeled (De Giorgi and Hens). Actually, we obtain such a result because the slope of
the weighting function at zero is inﬁnite. The more the probabilities are low, the more
they are overweighted. We propose to replace the speciﬁcation of the weighting function
proposed by Tversky and Kahneman with a polynomial functional. This functional form
exhibits a ﬁnite slope at the origin and preserves the main characteristics of the Tversky
and Kahneman’s inverse S-shape speciﬁcation: overweighting of small probabilities, un-
derweighting of moderate and high probabilities and the decreasing sensibility principle
We investigate on the optimal design of LLDA in this new framework. Our results are con-
sistent with the multiple accounts version of the behavioral portfolio theory (BPT-MA)
The paper is structured as follows: In section II, we review the main characteristics
of CPT developed by Tversky and Kahneman. Section III establishes the optimal design
of LLDA in CPT framework. In section IV, we modify the speciﬁcation of the weighting
function and analyze the new structure of payments obtained with this functional. The
paper concludes in section V with a summary of our ﬁndings.
2 Review of Prospect Theory
In this section, we introduce CPT by ﬁrst reviewing the main observations established by
Tversky and Kahneman.2.1 Main observations
- As in expected utility theory, investors determine the subjective value of each outcome
via a value function. However, under CPT utility is deﬁned over gains and losses rather
than over ﬁnal asset position, so risky prospects are evaluated relatively to a reference
point. This reference point corresponds to the asset position one expects to reach.
- Investors transform probabilities via a weighting function. They overweight the prob-
abilities of extreme outcomes (events at the tails of the distribution) and underweight
outcomes with average probabilities. The weighting function is concave near 0 and convex
near 1.
- The sensibility relatively to the reference point is decreasing. The value function v is
then concave over gains and convex over losses
- Investors dislike loss. The loss of $100 creates a distress greater than the satisfaction
generated by the gain of the same amount of money. The value function is then steeper
for losses than for gains.
- Experimental evidence has established a “fourfold pattern of risk attitudes”: risk aver-
sion for most gains and low probability losses, and risk seeking for most losses and low
probability gains.
2.2 Modelisation.
Consider a prospect X deﬁned by:
X = ((xi,pi)i = −m,....n)
with x−m < x−m+1 < .... < x0 = 0 < x1 < x2 < ... < xn.
Gains and losses are evaluated diﬀerently by investors. The subjective utility V of a
prospect X is then deﬁned by:V (X) = V (X+) + V (X−) (1)













where v is a strictly increasing value function deﬁned with respect to a reference point
satisfying v(x0) = v(0) = 0.
π+ = (π+
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i = w+(pi + ..... + pn) − w+(pi+1 + ..... + pn) with 0 ≤ i ≤ n-1
π−
i = w−(p−m + ..... + pi) − w−(p−m + ..... + pi−1) with − m ≤ i ≤ 0
with w+(0) = 0 = w−(0) and w+(1) = 1 = w−(1)
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed the following functional form for the value func-
tion:v(x) =

xα if x > 0
−δ(−x)−β if x < 0

(3)
The parameter λ describes the degree of loss aversion (K¨ obberling and Wakker, 2005).
Based on experimental evidences, Tversky and Kahneman estimated the values of the
parameters α, β, and δ α = β = 0.88 and δ = 2.25.
They proposed the following functional form for the weighting function:
w+(p) =
pγ+
[pγ+ + (1 − p)γ+]1/γ+ w−(p) =
pγ−
[pγ− + (1 − p)γ−]1/γ− (4)
Tversky and Kahneman estimated the parameters γ+ and γ− as 0.61 and 0.69.
3 Optimal Design in CPT framework
3.1 The optimal structure of payments
3.1.1 Theoretical framework
Our aim is to determine the optimal structure of payments of any lottery-linked-deposit-
accounts. We are looking for the structure of payments that maximizes the satisfaction
of investors given an expected return (cost) equal to the risk-free interest rate. In this
framework, the savings account will be optimal for investors, and thus very attractive to
them. And as many investors will subscribe to the contract proposed by the issuer of the
asset, the administrative and management costs will be spread over more clients. This will
inevitably lead to economies of scale. Consequently, the issuer will have two advantages.
On one hand, its expected cost will be the risk-free interest rate; a low interest rate. On
the other hand, he will beneﬁt from the economies of scale.
Let’s consider a lottery-linked-ﬁnancial-asset that provides n prizes. Every dollar



































be the probability distribution of the lottery1.
In order to determine the optimal structure of payments, we maximize the satisfaction of
investors given an expected cost equal to the risk-free interest rate (rf). Let V (X) be the
subjective utility of the lottery (the satisfaction of investors). V (X) is given by:
V (X) = π1 [−δ(r − y1)α] +
n X
i=2
πi(yi − r)α (5)

























is the vector of decision weights.
r represents the investors’ reference point. We remind that under CPT utility is deﬁned by
gains and losses, so a risky prospect is evaluated relatively to a reference point. A payoﬀ
less than r is considered as a loss and a payoﬀ greater than r is considered as a gain. In this
study, we assume that the ﬁrst payment, y1, is the loosing prize of the lottery. It is then
1The probability distribution is considered as an exogenous data the issuer cannot modify.inferior to the reference point r and represents a loss for investors. Therefore the potential
loss relatively to the reference point (r − y1) is weighted by the loss aversion coeﬃcient
(δ). We also assume that the n − 1 other payments (y2, ..., yn) are winning prizes. They
are thus greater than the reference point. In this study, we class the reference point as the
long term interest rate.









πi(yi − r)α (6)
subject to

                   
                   
n X
i=1
pi × yi = rf
r − y1 ≥ 0
yi − r ≥ 0 , i = 2,...,n


















be the Lagrange multipliers..












λi(r − yi) +
n X
i=1
λn+i × yi − λ2n+1(
n X
i=1




k,.k = 1,.....2n + 1) such as:

                                              
                                              
∂L
∂yi
= 0 ∀i = 1,....,n
λi × (yi − r) = 0 ∀i = 1,....,n
λn+i × yi = 0 ∀i = 1,....,n
n X
i=1
pi × yi = rf
∀i = 1,....,2n + 1
λi ≥ 0
r − y1 ≥ 0
yi − r ≥ 0 ∀i = 2,....,n





= π1 × β × δ(r − y1)β−1 − λ1 + λn+1 − p1 × λ2n+1 (10)
∂L
∂yi
= πi × α(yi − r)α−1 + λi + λn+i − pi × λ2n+1 , i = 2,....n (11)
The optimal solution is given by2:
2Details of resolution are available from the author.y1 = 0
(12)





































, i = 2,...,n
3.1.2 Application to Premium Bonds
To comment this result, we can apply it to the Premium Bonds, which are one of the
most popular lottery-linked-ﬁnancial-asset available at this period. Premium Bonds are
investments in which instead of getting an interest rate, investors have the chance to
win tax-free prizes. For each pound invested, investors receive one bond. Each bond
automatically enrolls the holder in a monthly lottery. The prize fund for each draw is
shared between three prize bands (higher value, medium value and lower value) and prizes
range from £50 to £1 million. Each month’s prize fund is calculated relatively to one
month’s interest determined by the Treasury. For example, in February 2006, the interest
rate determined by the Treasury was 0.25% (3% per year). The prizes were allocated in
such a way that the expected value of the lottery was 0.25%. Table 1 shows the percentage
share of the fund allocated to each prize band, together with the number of prizes, their
value and the corresponding probabilities of winning for February 2006.
The application of CPT to Premium Bonds underlines that investors would prefer
holding these lottery bonds rather than regular assets that provide a ﬁxed annual in-
terest rate of 4.05%3 (Pﬁﬀelmann, 2007b). Although these bonds are very attractive to
investors, their structure of payments can be modiﬁed so that investors’ satisfaction is
maximal. With the results obtained previously, we can determine for which structure of
3The long term interest in 2006Table 1: Premium Savings Bonds - February 2006
Prize band Prize value Number of prizes Probability
Higher value £1 million 2 6.7693×10−11
7% of prize fund £100 000 6 2.0308×10−10
£50 000 13 4.4001×10−10
£25 000 26 8.8002×10−10
£10 000 64 2.1662×10−9
£5 000 126 4.2642×10−9
Medium value £1 000 1 772 5.9976×10−8
6% of prize fund £500 5 316 1.7993×10−7
Lower value £100 61 530 2.0826×10−6
87% of prize fund £50 1 162 176 3.9336×10−5
£0 29 543 512 969 0.999987

















these bonds provide the highest satisfaction to investors.
Table 2 displays the optimal structure of payments of one Premium Bonds.





6.7693×10−11 £1 million £36 795 327
2.0308×10−10 £100 000 £41 727
4.4001×10−10 £50 000 £1 127
8.8002×10−10 £25 000 £67
2.1662×10−9 £10 000 £4.42
4.2642×10−9 £5 000 £0.333267





The optimal structure of payments is highly skewed. The amount of the jackpot goes from
1 million to more than 35 million and the small and medium prizes have nearly disappeared.
The results derived here suggest that investors are willing to accept a decrease of value in
the medium prizes in order to increase the value of higher prizes. An explanation of thisresult lies on the fact that investors are motivated by hope: people dream of growing rich in
a sizeable way. In order to have a chance to access higher social standing, they are willing
to take risks and give up security. This explains why the issuers of the Premium Bonds
should modify the structure of payments by reducing the value of medium prizes in order
to increase the value of high prizes. This modiﬁcation would improve the attractiveness
of the bonds. The subjective utility V (X) goes from 0.2671 to 2.84.
The results derived here are consistent with the single account version of the behav-
ioral portfolio theory (BPT-SA) developed by Shefrin and Statman (2000). According to
Lopes (1987), three factors have to be taken into consideration in investors’ problem of
choice: security, potential and aspiration. Aspiration relates to a goal, a target value to
reach. Security and potential relate to the principal emotions that operate on investors.
On the one hand, investors are driven by fear and wish security for their wealth; they want
to avoid poverty. On the other hand, they are willing to take risks in order to become
rich. This falls under the concept of potential. Shefrin and Statman developed a portfolio
theory by using Lopes’ theory of choice under uncertainty. The optimal portfolio in the
behavioral portfolio theory is diﬀerent from the mean variance optimal portfolio. Accord-
ing to Shefrin and Statman, each investor determines a probability of acceptable ruin and
a target value that he wants to reach. He then secures his wealth to this target value in
almost every state. The number of states secured is determined according to the accept-
able probability of ruin each investor has previously established. The remaining wealth is
invested in one state. Investors wish to grow rich and bet on one particular state. If this
state occurs the portfolio holder will receive much more money than the usual coupon he
would have received in the other states. The payoﬀ of this optimal portfolio can be viewed
as a combination of bonds, risky or not, and a lottery ticket. The optimal structure of
payments we have obtained ﬁts perfectly into this result. Let’s consider an investor with
an aspiration level equal to the face value of the Premium Bonds and with a probability
of ruin equal to zero. In this case, the optimal structure of payments of these bonds is
quite similar to the optimal portfolio that would be obtained in behavioral portfolio theory
framework. A portfolio composed by Premium Bonds is safe. In every state, bondhold-ers will always get back the face value of the bonds. The investor’s principal is secured
and their wish of security is therefore satisﬁed. There are few states where they can win
a prize oﬀered by the lottery. Moreover, in one of these states, bondholders can win a
jackpot. This chance to win a large amount of money meets everyone’s desire to grow rich
in a sizeable way. Our results are thus consistent with the conclusions of the behavioral
portfolio theory developed by Shefrin and Statman.
Wagenaar (1988), Quiggin (1991) and Shapira and Venezia (1992) also underline the
important role of the ﬁrst prize on the design of lotteries. Both of them indicate that the
size of the jackpot has a major eﬀect on the demand of lotteries. However, Shapira and
Venezia do not deny the importance of the small and medium prizes on the framework of
a lottery. The possibility to win more frequently prevents the subscriber’s fatigue from the
low likelihood of winning. Clotfelter and Cook (1990) also emphasize the importance of
the small and medium prizes. According to them, when a player wins a small prize at the
lottery, the satisfaction does not come from the monetary gain but from the possibility to
reinvest this small prize in additional lottery tickets. In this way, the player increases their
possibility to win the ﬁrst prize. This possibility to reinvest small prizes can be viewed
as playing with house money; and when individuals play with house money they tend to
take more risks (Thaler et Johnson, 1990). Thus, in LLDA framework, the gain of a small
prize would lead the winner subscriber to reinvest in this asset.
Our results on the optimal design of LLDA underline that investors are willing to accept
a decrease of value in the medium and small prizes in order to increase the value of
the jackpot. This behavior is therefore consistent with the one observed by Shapira and
Venezia. However, the strong decrease of the values of the small and medium prizes runs
counter the contributions of Clotfelter and Cook. Actually, the value of the £50, £100,
£500 et £1 000 prizes decreases to less than £0.5.
3.2 Optimal payments and optimal probabilities
Let’s consider, as previously stated, a lottery-linked-ﬁnancial-asset that provides n prizes.
Each bond provides the possibility for subscribers to win one of the n payments. We
assume that the ﬁrst payment, y1, is the loosing prize of the lottery and that the n − 1other payments (y2, ..., yn) are winning prizes. Contrary to previously, we do not consider
that the issuer cannot modify the probabilities associated to each payment. Our aim is
now to determine for which payments and probabilities the investors satisfaction is the




















× (yi − r)
α + w+(pn) × (yn − r)α

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r − y1 ≥ 0
yi − r ≥ 0 , i = 2,...,n
yi ≥ 0 ∀i
pi > 0 ∀i
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The maximization problem is now more complex: both probabilities and payments must
be determined. In order to discuss the optimal design of LLDA we realize some simu-
lations4. The subjective utility V (X) seems to increase inﬁnitely when the jackpot (yn)





V (X) = +∞
4The details of the simulations are given in appendix.The solution derived here suggests that an inﬁnite jackpot associated to an extremely
small probability should be suﬃcient to attract many investors. Thus, the amount of the
jackpot would be the principal determinant of risk-seeking behavior, and the role of the
second prizes would be minor. But why have we obtained such a result? The explanation
lies on the shape of the weighting function.
Numbers of experiments underline the tendency of individuals to overweight small
probabilities. This overweighting of small probabilities induces risk seeking behavior in the
domain of gains. The probability weighting function permits probabilities to be weighted
nonlinearly. Lots of empirical studies have been done to determine the shape of the weight-
ing function (Lattimore and al, 1992; Wu and Gonzales, 1996; Prelec, 1998; Kilka and
Weber, 2001). The weighting function is represented, most of time, by an inverse S-shaped
(concave in the range (0,p∗) and convex in the range (p∗,1)). In our study we use the spec-
iﬁcation proposed by Tversky and Kahneman. But, we ﬁnd the same type of results with
the weighting function proposed by Prelec characterized by: w+(p) = exp[−β+(−ln(p))α].
The slope of these speciﬁcations tends towards inﬁnity, when the probabilities are ex-
tremely small (near 0). Therefore, the lower the probability, the more important the
overweighting is. An extremely small probability can thus be inﬁnitely overweighted. As
the value function is unbounded, there are situations for which the subjective value of a
consequence weighted by its decision weight can be inﬁnitely high. This explains why we
have found an inﬁnity jackpot with an inﬁnitesimal chance of winning.
4 Optimal design with a new weighting function
We propose to replace the weighting function speciﬁed by Tversky and Kahneman with
another functional form whose slope at zero is ﬁnite, which still satisﬁes the overweight-
ing of small probabilities, the underweighting of moderate and high probabilities and the
decreasing sensitivity principle. The polynomial form, (Pﬁﬀelmann, 2007a) presented be-
low, avoids subjective values for subjective utility, because its slope at zero is ﬁnite, and
satisﬁes the conditions describe above.w(p) = 2215.003p − 19080.29p1.1 + 30702.47p1.15 − 13963.8p1.2 (16)
+202.1941p2 − 76.95053p2.5 + 2.37243p6
If we realize the same simulations as the ones realized previously, the satisfaction of
investors does not increase inﬁnitely with the value of the ﬁrst prize5. From a threshold,
investors are not willing to reduce the values of the small and medium prizes in order to
increase the jackpot of the lottery. An inﬁnite ﬁrst prize associated to an extremely small
probability is not suﬃcient to attract a lot of investors. The replacement of the weighting
function then permits to obtain a more realistic result.
It would be interesting to determine the optimal structure of payments of lottery-
linked-ﬁnancial-assets with this new weighting function. As the probabilities are diﬀerently
transformed (near 0 and 1) with this polynomial weighting function, the optimal structure
of payments should be diﬀerent. Table 3 represents the optimal structure of payments of
one Premium Bond. The ﬁrst column displays the original structure of payments provided
by the issuer in February 2006. The second column displays the results we have obtained
in the previous section (the optimal structure of payments with the weighting function
speciﬁed by Tversky and Kahneman). The third column represents the optimal structure
of payments when the weighting function is the polynomial functional presented above.
The new optimal structure of payments is less skewed and dispersed than the one obtained
previously. The ﬁrst prize is now equal to £2.8 million instead of the £36 million obtained
previously. This result lies on the fact that the overweighting of small probabilities, the
overweighting of the event ”winning the ﬁrst prize,”is less important with the new weight-
ing function. The decision weight associated to this event is now about 7.9×10−8 (for a
probability equal to 6.7693×10−11), while it was equal to 6.26087×10−7 with the original
weighting function (so 8 times less). Therefore, if we take into account a weighting func-
tion whose slope is ﬁnite at zero, the optimal structure of payments will not devote almost
all the prize fund to the jackpot. With this new structure of payments the medium prizes







y1 0 0 0
y2 50 0.003375 0.11
y3 100 0.003375 65
y4 500 0.003383 1 630
y5 1 000 0.004684 10 766
y6 5 000 0.333267 65 728
y7 10 000 4.42 133 085
y8 25 000 67 262 360
y9 50 000 1 127 494 576
y10 100 000 41 727 1 020 835
y11 1 000 000 36 795 327 2 882 626
have not disappeared and are now relatively signiﬁcant. However, the ﬁrst prize is still
higher than the one really provided by the issuer. This optimal structure of payments still
underlines he major role of the ﬁrst prize on the design of LLDA.
These results are consistent with the multiple accounts version of the behavioral
portfolio theory (Shefrin and Statman, 2000). In the BPT-MA version, Shefrin and Stat-
man integrate the mental accounting structure from Kahneman and Tversky prospect
theory. They take into account that most investors combine low aspiration and high aspi-
ration levels. Thus, they act as if they create mental accounts and apply speciﬁc decision
rules to each account, segregating their portfolio into distinct mental accounts (Thaler,
1985). For each account, investors secure their wealth to the target value corresponding
to this account. They then invest the remaining wealth in one particular state. The opti-
mal portfolio of each account consists mainly on bonds (risky or not) and lottery tickets,
but ”the accounts are pushed in the layers to the extremes” (Shefrin and Statman, 2000).
The account that corresponds to the lowest aspiration level is mainly made up with risk-
free bonds, whereas the highest aspiration level account is more like a lottery ticket. The
optimal portfolio can be view as a combination of bonds that intend to satisfy several
aspiration levels and lottery tickets. The optimal structure of payments we have obtained
for LLDA perfectly ﬁts into this result. Each payment corresponds to one aspiration level
where the lowest one can be assimilated to the status quo.5 Discussion
In this study, we have investigated the optimal design of lottery-linked-deposit-accounts
given that all investors have Tversky and Kahneman’s individual preferences. The popular-
ity of these ﬁnancial assets cannot be understood in light of traditional models of rational
choices such as expected utility theory. It has been observed that investors transform
objective probabilities via a weighting function, which overweights the tails of a proba-
bility distribution. This observation cannot be integrated in the framework of expected
utility theory. Under cumulative prospect theory, people express risk seeking behavior
for low probability gains. We show that such a behavior can explain the development of
these ﬁnancial accounts. In this study, we determine the optimal structure of payments
of these ﬁnancial assets under CPT framework. The analysis presented here suggests that
the lottery should be strongly asymmetrical. In order to attract a maximum number of
investors, banks should provide ﬁnancial assets that are very positively skewed. The op-
timal structure of payments derived in this study is then consistent with the behavioral
portfolio theory developed by Shefrin and Statman (2000). On the one hand, LLDA are
”riskless”: the lottery does not aﬀect the principal but only the interest rate provided
by the issuer. Thus, the security desire of investors (driven by fear) is fulﬁlled. On the
other hand, investors can win a large amount of money. The possibility of winning a
large jackpot makes investors (driven this time by potential) dream of and meets their
expectations of wealth. We also point out that, under CPT, the satisfaction of investors
seems to increase inﬁnitely when the jackpot tends towards inﬁnity with an inﬁnitesimally
chance of winning. An inﬁnite jackpot associated to an extremely small probability should
be suﬃcient to attract a lot of investors. We suggest that an explanation of the results
could lie on the shape of the weighting function. In our study, we use an inverse S-shape
weighting function (the one formed by Tversky and Kahneman) because this function pro-
vides a good explanation of risk taking behavior. However, the slope of this function tends
towards inﬁnity when the probability of winning is extremely small. Thus, obtaining such
results is not amazing, but is it realistic to imagine a ﬁnancial asset that provides only an
inﬁnite gain with an inﬁnitesimally chance of winning?We then propose to replace the weighting function speciﬁed by Tversky and Kah-
neman with a polynomial functional that preserves the main characteristics of the inverse
S-shape speciﬁcation but whose slope at zero is ﬁnite. Resorting to this functional permits
to avoid inﬁnite subjective utility for any LLDA. The satisfaction of investors does not
anymore increase inﬁnitely with the value of the ﬁrst prize. The optimal structure of
payments we have obtained in this new framework still suggests that the lottery should be
strongly asymmetrical to attract a maximum number of investors, but it does not challenge
to role of the medium prizes in the design of lotteries.
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Table 4: Simulations -Tversky and Kahneman weighting function
y1 y2 y3 y4 p1 p2 p3 p4 V(X)
0 11.9 26.8 479 0.9998 5.79×10−5 5.79×10−5 5.79×10−5 0.5
0 206 213 2345 0.99996 1.08×10−5 1.08×10−5 1.08×10−5 0.8
0 900 10 000 2 800 000 0.9999989 1×10−6 1×10−7 1×10−8 6.3
0 900 10 000 28 000 000 0.9999989 1×10−6 1×10−7 1×10−10 11.6
0 5 6 29 900 000 0.9999989 1×10−6 1×10−7 1×10−10 12.2
0 5 6 2.99×1011 0.9999989 1×10−6 1×10−7 1×10−13 147.3
0 4 4 2.99005×1011 0.9999989 1×10−6 1×10−7 1×10−13 147.4
Table 5: Simulations - Polynomial weighting function
y1 y2 y3 y4 p1 p2 p3 p4 V(X)
s1 0 5 10 299 940 0.9999988 1×10−6 1×10−7 1×10−7 3.76
s2 0 5 10 2 999 400 0.99999889 1×10−6 1×10−7 1×10−8 3.77
s3 0 5 10 29 999 400 0.999998899 1×10−6 1×10−7 1×10−9 3.53
s4 0 5 500 2 993 599 0.99999887 1×10−6 1×10−7 1×10−8 3.78
s5 0 5 500 2 993 599 0.999999989 0 0 1.02×10−8 3.76             
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